Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100170039-4 NRO review(s) completed.

TS	22 August 1963	25X1
	. '	

Dr. Wheelon's Views on the NRO Problem

First premise: that CIA had a demonstrated ability to identify and pursue agressively and successfully recon programs responsive to national intelligence needs (wink i.e., the U-2, CORONA, OXCART).

- 2. Air Force objective to eliminate the CIA from all recon operations.
- 3. NRO agreement provides enabling legislation by which CIA can be so eliminated since DNRO has power to reassign programs.
- 4. DNRO has come to be identified with U/S AF, thereby posing conflict of interest question.
- 5. CIA participation has decreased steadily since NRO began, NRO staff almost exclusively AF and their advice to DNRO consistently supported erosion of CIA participation.
- 6. Geary, once responsible solely for AF support to CIA projects, now also responsible for solely AF projects which are competitive to CIA projects.
- 7. CIA part in satellite program now limited by General Greer's take-over of management, to extraordinary contracting, and security responsibility for covert portion of program. Contractors now look to Gen Greer as their sole benefactor.
- 8. DNRO feels no responsibility to COMOR and asserts that COMOR has not and is not abstate to provide him with meaningful guidance.
- 9. DNRO believes his is a line responsibility running directly to Gen Ledford in CIA. DNRO works with Fubini on AF side in quite a different way from Gen. Carter who is given final decisions, while Fubini wex participates in all decision-making in advance.
- 10. DNRO considers his decisions on program allocations as final and their challenge is unacceptable to him.

He recommends that CIA withdraw from NRO and responsibility for all its recon operations be assumed by the DCI as Executive Agent. DNRO drop his line authority over elements contributing to NRP, i.e. Col. Ledford work for XXX CIA under DDS&T who would be responsible for CIA participation in the NRP.

Return to partnership with AF (and NASA) in development of new systems.

CIA should fund its own participation in NRP. BOB believes that program control and financial control are indissolubly linked. In my view, our experience in the NRO shows that they are correct..

A joint budget shld be prepared by the AF and CIA reflecting the NRP, and the BOB shld be encouraged to look at the total package in this way. However, the basic funding shld be carried in the individual services in accordance with that plan.

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100170039-4, 463

O/DDS&T - Personnel Rqmts

In determining appropriate size of a staff element to render immediate support to the DD/S&T, major emphasis was given to insure that two of the major drives leading to the establishment of this Directorate would receive specific and continuing attention. The first of these was the creation of an integrated professional establishment that could perform the necessary s and t tasks throughout the entire spectrum of tech intel; i.e., research, devel, industrial production, deployment, collection, processing and analysis, feedback, and intel production. The second drive was to marshall the professionally qualified personnel assets of the CIA so that the most practical in-house capability in the field of tech intel wld be under single manager direction. A residual benefit of the latter goal was to broaden the horizon of development and advancement for officers qualified in the s and t fields. The personnel authorization for the staff element for the previous DD/R is inadequate for the scope and depth of these responsibilities of DD/S&T.

Personnel auth for the immed Office, including staff, of DD/R were set for both FY 1964 and 65. No allowance was made under that auth for staff officers assisting in the guidance, coordination planning and review of substantive activities. Realizing the inadequacy of this number, but desiring some guidance on Agency views in such matters, advice concerning ratios of staffs to operating components in other substantive Directorates was obtained. Based on demonstrable needs of DDS&T and well within apparent Agency norms on such matters, it is requested for FY 1964 be authorized for immed off of DDS&T for FY 65. This will allow estab. of a Plans and Programs Staff, designed to insure closest collab and coord between our current and proposed activities and the most efficient utilization of our monetary and personnel allowances; an Action Staff, designed to furnish a quick reaction capability to immediate information requests and to represent the operating components on matters of collection and requirements; a Systems Analysis Staff, consisting of a small group of highly qualified officers who can both study and conduct theoretical tests on proposed technical collection defices, and can analyze failures and inadequacies in current systems and devices; and a slightly expanded Support Staff so that greater attention can be given to security and career management matters. STAT The figure of an irreducible minimum for the discharge of these varied functions during this FY and the small increase of for FY 65 merely reflects the planned scope of organization and opnl activity for the entire Directorate ast that time.

STAT

STAT STAT

STAT